Judicial Behavior(司法行为)研究综述
Judicial Behavior 司法行为 - This work extends the audiences literature in judicial politics to extra-judicial behavior of judges. [1] How are concrete sentences established by Chilean courts? Under which conditions is parole granted? When do Chilean courts deviate from the more general standards of judicial behavior? The paper attempts to establish recurring behavior in Chilean criminal courts, in order to assess its effects in the criminal justice and corrections system and to evaluate the merits and shortcomings of the local reality of sentencing. [2] Moreover, the established judicial database can be a useful source toward a better understanding of judicial behavior. [3] Our theory identifies two distinct mechanisms that underpin responsiveness in judicial behavior, implying that the chief justice and the most moderate (swing) justice are more likely than their colleagues to adjust their behavior in response to external threats from Congress. [4] Particularly, I seek to disentangle two features of judicial behavior that are known to affect the decision to dissent: ideological heterogeneity and dissent aversion. [5] The present project remedies that by easing access to such data and lowering the threshold for empirical studies on judicial behavior. [6] Although law and economics has branched out from its traditional emphasis on private law to topics such as criminal law, judicial behavior, and agency structure, free speech has faded from its focus. [7] Our results underscore the importance of paying close attention to selection effects when evaluating the impact of legal changes on judicial behavior. [8] The article demonstrates the importance of partisan alignment with the executive in shaping support for judicial power, with implications for judicial behavior and legitimacy. [9] Recent work suggests that subtle differences in how novel Black faces are initially perceived relate to prejudicial behavior. [10] I provide a test of the legal realist theory of judicial behavior, which posits that judges’ ideology impacts their legal decisions but that the law constrains the judges’ ability to exercise those preferences. [11] We introduce each model from a formal axiomatic perspective, briefly discuss practical motivation for each in terms of judicial behavior, prove mathematical relationships among the voting coalitions compatible with each model, and then study the two-dimensional setting by presenting computational tools for working with the models and by exploring these with judicial voting data from the Supreme Court. [12] The results of an ex-post survey suggest that this sophisticated form of discrimination is mainly due to the prejudicial behavior of sellers belonging to an established local ethnic minority group towards buyers belonging to a low-status immigrant ethnic minority group. [13] This article provides a new perspective on judicial behavior. [14]这项工作将司法政治中的受众文献扩展到法官的法外行为。 [1] 智利法院如何确定具体判决？在什么条件下可以假释？智利法院何时偏离更普遍的司法行为标准？本文试图建立智利刑事法院的反复行为，以评估其在刑事司法和惩戒系统中的影响，并评估当地量刑现实的优缺点。 [2] 此外，已建立的司法数据库可以成为更好地理解司法行为的有用来源。 [3] 我们的理论确定了支持司法行为响应能力的两种不同机制，这意味着首席大法官和最温和（摇摆不定）的大法官比他们的同事更有可能调整自己的行为以应对来自国会的外部威胁。 [4] 特别是，我试图解开已知会影响异议决定的司法行为的两个特征：意识形态异质性和异议厌恶。 [5] 本项目通过放宽对此类数据的访问并降低对司法行为进行实证研究的门槛来弥补这一点。 [6] 尽管法律和经济学已经从传统的对私法的强调延伸到刑法、司法行为和代理结构等主题，但言论自由已经淡出其关注点。 [7] 我们的结果强调了在评估法律变化对司法行为的影响时密切关注选择效应的重要性。 [8] 这篇文章展示了党派与行政部门在形成对司法权力的支持方面的重要性，这对司法行为和合法性产生了影响。 [9] 最近的研究表明，最初对新颖黑人面孔的感知方式的细微差异与偏见行为有关。 [10] 我提供了对司法行为的法律现实主义理论的检验，该理论假设法官的意识形态影响他们的法律决定，但法律限制了法官行使这些偏好的能力。 [11] 我们从形式公理化的角度介绍每个模型，简要讨论每个模型在司法行为方面的实际动机，证明与每个模型兼容的投票联盟之间的数学关系，然后通过提供用于处理该模型的计算工具来研究二维设置模型，并通过最高法院的司法投票数据探索这些模型。 [12] 事后调查的结果表明，这种复杂的歧视形式主要是由于属于当地少数民族的卖家对属于低地位移民少数民族的买家的偏见行为。 [13] 本文为司法行为提供了一个新的视角。 [14]