## What is/are Masking Scheme?

Masking Scheme - There exists many masking schemes to protect implementations of cryptographic operations against side-channel attacks.^{[1]}Being based on a sound theoretical basis, masking schemes are commonly applied to protect cryptographic implementations against Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks.

^{[2]}In particular, we provide new and more efficient algorithms for the computation of basic operations in two kinds of masking schemes: the Boolean masking and the Inner Product masking.

^{[3]}Our goal is to train this method to an agent through reinforcement learning to generate S-boxes to which the masking scheme, which is a countermeasure of side-channel attack, can be efficiently applied.

^{[4]}Masking schemes are a popular countermeasure against side-channel attacks.

^{[5]}This paper presents a unified approach to quantifying the information leakages in the most general code-based masking schemes.

^{[6]}The masking scheme for multiplication can be applied to a GM polynomial, which is more efficient than the masking scheme for a polynomial with a low algebraic degree.

^{[7]}We propose a masking scheme to exclude noisy evanescent regions in the SH domain from the NTF cost function.

^{[8]}Masking schemes are among the most popular countermeasures against Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks.

^{[9]}In addition, the random probing model is much more convenient than the noisy leakage model to prove the security of masking schemes.

^{[10]}Hence demonstrating the feasibility of full pre-processing of higher-order lookup table-based masking schemes on resource-constrained devices has remained an open problem.

^{[11]}Further integrated with a masking scheme, the learnt policy is expected to find higher-quality solutions for solving PDP.

^{[12]}1) We generalise the theorems on which this model is based, so as to be able to apply them to masking schemes over any finite field — in particular F2 — and to be able to analyse the strong non-interference (SNI) security notion.

^{[13]}The probing security model is widely used to formally prove the security of masking schemes.

^{[14]}Code-based masking schemes have been shown to provide higher theoretical security guarantees than Boolean masking.

^{[15]}Masking schemes represent prevailing countermeasures to reduce the success probabilities of side-channel attacks.

^{[16]}Typical mitigations against such attacks are hiding and masking schemes, to increase attackers' efforts in terms of side-channel measurements.

^{[17]}Furthermore, as a follow-up to some proof-of-concept work indicating the vulnerability of masking schemes to static powerattacks, we perform a detailed study on how the reduction of the noise level in static leakage measurements affects the security provided by masked implementations.

^{[18]}The issues discussed include improper lift off, annealing issues when tempress furnace is used which leads to increased contact resistance (Rc), issues regarding the masking scheme (alignment issues).

^{[19]}Furthermore, using the masking scheme(Mukherjee and Wichs in EUROCRYPT 2016), we construct an efficient multi-identity fully homomorphic encryption (MIFHE) scheme by expanding a “fresh” ciphertext under a single identity key to an “expanded” one under a combined key that enables ciphertexts under different identities to be homomorphically evaluated.

^{[20]}In this work, we investigate the security of masking schemes against PFA.

^{[21]}Masking scheme is one of the countermeasures that are commonly used to counteract such attacks.

^{[22]}Two cores conduct forward and backward propagation in convolutional layers and utilize a masking scheme to reduce 88.

^{[23]}Masking schemes are a prominent countermeasure against power analysis and work by concealing the values that are produced during the computation through randomness.

^{[24]}In this paper, a masking scheme for SM3-MAC algorithm using key mask is proposed.

^{[25]}This paper presents an efficient hardware based 128-bit AES design using a masking scheme which is resistant to a side channel attack.

^{[26]}

## Order Masking Scheme

The design of glitch-resistant higher-order masking schemes is an important challenge in cryptographic engineering.^{[1]}The maturity of high-order masking schemes has reached the level where the concepts are sound and proven.

^{[2]}Recently, inner product masking (IPM) was proposed as a promising higher-order masking scheme against side-channel analysis, but not for fault injection attacks.

^{[3]}For security circuit implementation, a high order masking scheme in modelsim is implemented.

^{[4]}

## Independent Masking Scheme

To further decrease the complexity of the independent masking scheme, a nested version is presented, where the MESs for varying^{[1]}(ToSC 2017, Issue 1), but their proof requires a 4-wise independent masking scheme that uses 4 n-bit random values.

^{[2]}

## Entropy Masking Scheme

Low Entropy Masking Schemes (LEMS) had been proposed to mitigate the high-performance overhead results from the Full Entropy Masking Schemes (FEMS) while offering good protection against side-channel attacks.^{[1]}The low-entropy masking scheme (LEMS) is a cost-security tradeoff solution that ensures a certain level of security with much lower overheads than a full-entropy masking scheme (FEMS).

^{[2]}

## Boolean Masking Scheme

To strengthen the original Boolean masking scheme, several works have suggested using schemes with high algebraic complexity.^{[1]}The robustness of the proposed outer masking which is a modified version of the existing first-order Boolean masking scheme is evaluated by the Welch's t-test statistical analysis and also experimental results while the efficiency of the internal randomization technique inside the SBox module is based on the randomization in the underlying composite field GF(24)2.

^{[2]}

## Efficient Masking Scheme

Then we propose a provably secure and highly efficient masking scheme for AES linear operations.^{[1]}In this work, the authors propose some alternative hardware efficient masking schemes dedicated to protect the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) against higher order differential power analysis (DPA).

^{[2]}

## Several Masking Scheme

We show that this strategy can be adapted to several masking schemes, inherently to the way the splitting is realized.^{[1]}Inner Product Masking (IPM) is a generalization of several masking schemes including the Boolean one to protect cryptographic implementation against side-channel analysis.

^{[2]}