Board Independence(이사회 독립성)란 무엇입니까?
Board Independence 이사회 독립성 - Tracing the Greek financial crisis during the period of 2008 to 2018, the paper investigates whether board size, board independence, CEO duality, female directors, and foreign directors affect banks performance. [1] PurposeThis study investigates the effect of board independence on private information-based trading (PIBT) events. [2] However, the audit committee characteristics represented by expertise, board independence, board size and frequently meetings are the independent variables of the current study, and return on equity and earning per share a proxy of financial performance are the dependent variables. [3] Second, this study examines (1) cubic S-curve relationship between board independence and IC efficiency and (2) how firm size moderates the cubic S-curve relationship. [4] Using the 2003 SEC regulations (following the Sarbanes–Oxley Act) on board independence as an identification for externally imposed governance changes, I compare its influence on firm performance to the effect of voluntarily conducted adjustments. [5] The study aims to gain empirical evidence about the effect of board independence, managerial ownership, debt ratio, liquidity, firm age, firm size, and firm growth to firm performance. [6] Purpose: This study attempts to analyze the influence of board structure (board size, board independence, CEO duality, insider ownership) on performance of Bangladeshi listed nonfinancial firms during the post-shock period of stock prices. [7] PurposeThis paper investigates the role of board independence in determining the relationship between firm ownership and auditor choice. [8] Further, we also find that, between profitability and government regulation and between enterprise size and board independence are interchangeable condition variables; public attention outweighs other factors for Chinese mining enterprises. [9] The contextual board characteristics of empirical interest include board size, financial knowledge of board members, frequency of board meetings, gender diversity and board independence. [10] The study reveals that board independence and diligence of independent directors do not play any role in curbing earnings management. [11] Its mechanisms based on nine corporate governance mechanisms, including board independence, board remuneration, CEO financial expertise, expertise in CEO industry, board financial expertise, board industry expertise, board effort, CEO duality and managerial ownership, have been examined. [12] Purpose This study aims to examine the significance of the non-linear relationship of board size and board independence on the financial performance of listed non-financial firms in India. [13] Purpose This study aims to investigate the impact of board independence on the cash dividend payments of family firms listed on the Borsa Istanbul (BIST) in balancing controlling families’ power to mitigate agency problems between family and minority shareholders in the post-2012 period. [14] Findings The results reveal that sustainability reporting is associated with board independence only, whilst the adoption of integrated reporting is influenced by board size and board independence. [15] CEO career horizon and CEO unexercisable stock options are boundary conditions that weaken the negative relationship between female CEOs and community engagement, while board independence does not have a significant moderating effect. [16] Using data from the Italian listed corporations in 2018, this paper combines several attributes like board independence, board size, the existence of the internal audit, and CEO duality incorporated in a corporate governance quality index. [17] This research aimed to acquire an empirical evidence regarding the effect of growth, financial leverage, fixedasset turnover, profitability, firm size, firm age, audit quality, board independence, and managerial ownership as independent variables, on earnings management as a dependent variable. [18] The degree of board independence is positively related to the level of mandatory disclosure in firms with no state ownership. [19] Board composition is sub-divided into three groups: board structure, board independence and board diversity. [20] Using a sample of 1,438 firm-year observations for the period of 2005 to 2011 and the panel data approach, this study finds that dividend payout is significantly positively (negatively) correlated with board size, board independence, institutional ownership and use of a Big-4 audit firm (CEO duality and managerial ownership). [21] Board attributes such as board size, board independence, female board representation and CEO-chair duality are included. [22] With regard to this, compliance with provisions related to board independence is more important than complying with performance‐related pay requirements of the code. [23] The research results show that board independence is positively correlated with corporate performance. [24] The results of the study display that board independence is negatively connected with ROA. [25] Specifically, this study investigate dividend decision (dividend per share(DPS)), corporate governance (board independence ,board size, size of firm, leverage, profitability, Insider ownership, individual ownership, and institutional ownership). [26] Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that board size and board independence are positively associated with firms’ risk disclosure during uncertainty but board meeting frequency and gender diversity seem inconsequential for risk disclosure. [27] Findings: The findings revealed that an increase in the number of directors, board independence, CEO duality, and inflation negatively influence the cost of capital. [28] Design/methodology/approachThe authors consider three main board characteristics, namely, board size, board independence and board leadership structure, and investigate their impacts on a multidimensional construct of environmental performance. [29] The results revealed that board independence, size, expertise, size of the audit committee, expertise and independence exhibit a significant influence on compliance with Ind-AS. [30] Findings – This study found that director size and board independence have a positive impact toward SOEs financial performance. [31] Design/Methodology: Relying on a quasi-natural experiment, we execute a difference-in-difference analysis based on an exogenous regulatory shock to board independence. [32] The baseline model shows a strong positive association between board independence, CEO duality, women directors, and firm CSR score. [33] In response to corporate scandals in the early 2000s, the China Securities Regulatory Commission introduced a new reform requiring an increase in board independence. [34] The disclosure levels are positively associated with manufacturing firms, board independence, foreign ownership, government ownership, audit quality and firm size. [35] This study’s corporate governance variables are the board size, board independence, and bank ownership category. [36] Furthermore, they show a non-significant impact of board independence. [37] The study revealed that the debt maturity structure mediates the relationship between board independence and financial distress and between CEO non-duality and financial distress but the capital structure did not mediate any of the stated relationships. [38] This study aims to determine the effect of board diversity, board size, and board independence on financial performance. [39] Furthermore, this study suggests that board size, board independence, board meetings, industry type, profitability and firm size are positively associated with CED level. [40] Therefore, this paper measures the moderating role of institutional ownership on the relationship between board independence and firms’ capital structure. [41] As for the board independence, it has reduced earnings manipulation measured by the abnormal provisions. [42] Effective variables in corporate governance system in banks included the board independence, duality of CEO duties, and major shareholders as input variables in data envelopment analysis (DEA) model. [43] Originality/valueTo the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study that deals with the role of ownership structure on the ESG disclosure level separately and collectively through the moderating role of board independence. [44] This study further empirically examines the influence of board independence on financial performance by using the world’s top 1000 firms. [45] Firms should strengthen the board independence and properly constitute the board committees (compensation, risk, nomination…). [46] There was, however, a significant positive correlation between board independence and REM. [47] Then, we use Random Forest Regression to examine the impact of corporate governance (Board Size, Board Independence, Duality, Gender Diversity, and Board Meetings), bank characteristics (Return on Assets, Size, and Equity to Total Assets), and other characteristics (Ownership and Years) on bank efficiency. [48] Here, we examine banks’ risk behavior associated with the degree of board independence and the choice of regulator. [49] Results: The model I of the study disclose a pessimistic and insignificant impact of board size and board independence on IC using VAIC as a proxy. [50]이 논문은 2008년부터 2018년까지의 그리스 금융 위기를 추적하여 이사회 규모, 이사회 독립성, CEO 이중성, 여성 이사 및 외국인 이사가 은행 실적에 영향을 미치는지 여부를 조사합니다. [1] 목적이 연구는 PIBT(Private Information-Based Trading) 이벤트에 대한 이사회 독립성의 영향을 조사합니다. [2] 그러나 전문성, 이사회 독립성, 이사회 규모, 빈번한 회의 등으로 대표되는 감사위원회 특성은 본 연구의 독립변수이며 재무성과를 나타내는 자기자본이익률(ROE)과 주당순이익은 종속변수이다. [3] 둘째, 본 연구에서는 (1) 보드 독립성과 IC 효율성 간의 3차 S-곡선 관계와 (2) 기업 규모가 3차 S-곡선 관계를 조절하는 방법을 조사합니다. [4] 2003년 SEC 규정(Sarbanes-Oxley 법에 따름)을 이사회 독립성으로 사용하여 외부적으로 부과된 지배