Introduction to Costly Punishment

The evolution of costly punishment is a puzzle due to cooperators’ second-order free-riding.

To determine the role of moral norms in cooperation and punishment, we examined the effects of a moral-framing manipulation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a costly punishment option.

This study empirically investigates costly punishment behavior for stores' violation of restrictions and how this behavior changes when a decision‐maker receives information pertaining to contrasting norms, implicitly requiring the opposite response.

The current study investigated two types of punishment (prosocial and proself punishment) in the ultimatum game (UG) and examined the impact of individuals' prosocial orientation on the costly punishment in the UG in a representative sample of Chinese undergraduate students (N = 344).

Our findings also show that SA was associated with a tendency toward costly punishment, that is, both SA subgroups engaged in more punitive actions in spite of financial loss.

We investigate the interaction and evolution between the preferences for reciprocity or rewarding of the allocator and the preferences to punish hostile behaviour by the investor in a trust game with a costly punishment phase.

We argue that reputation-based deterrence sheds light on phenomena such as costly punishment and fairness, and might serve as a possible explanation for the evolution of informal property rights.

Do individuals consider bribery as an acceptable behavior? We use a newly-designed game to study if—and under which conditions—bystanders are willing to express disapproval for bribing behavior through costly punishment.

The subsequent level of the hierarchy on the one hand defines different kinds of prosocial behavior in humans according to the source of general motivation being for example motivated by empathy, external rewards like reputation, or even by anger in case of costly punishment.

While some individuals initiate costly punishment against an unfair person independently of what other observers do (independent punishers), others condition their punishment engagement on the presence of another person who punishes (conditional punishers).

Social learning mechanisms (in-group information sharing, imitation, costly punishment) have amplified the effect of people’s experiences with the pandemic.

Humans are motivated to give norm violators their just deserts through costly punishment even as unaffected third parties (i.

Costly punishment and reward have been regarded as potential means to handle the conundrum of cooperation.

We use an experiment to test the hypothesis that groups consisting of like-minded cooperators are able to cooperate irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free riders, who are unable to cooperate without punishment.

Inspired by the works suggesting that the costly punishment would sustain the contribution level in public goods experiment, we compare the economic behavior of Mongolian- and Han-Chinese and investigate how ethnic diversity would affect contribution, punishment, and the marginal effect of punishment on contribution.

Second-party punishment (SPP) and third-party punishment (TPP) are two basic forms of costly punishment that play an essential role in maintaining social orders.

We apply a novel behavioral motivation, frustration-dependent anger, that links unmet payoff expectations with the willingness to forgo material payoffs to punish others, and we conjecture that communication works through this mechanism to raise expectations about the likelihood of belief-dependent costly punishment and to increase trust, cooperation, and efficiency.

Various forms of punishment are proposed to explain why costly punishment could be maintained in the population and stabilize cooperation.

It is often assumed that people engage in costly punishment of third parties for prosocial reasons.

In these studies (ages 3-6, total N = 225), participants of all ages enacted costly punishment, and rates of punishment increased with age.

A patient’s costly punishment is introduced as a mechanism to enhance cooperation among the three populations.

In these studies (ages 3-6, total N = 225), participants of all ages enacted costly punishment, and rates of punishment increased with age.

Our results suggest that groups with identities founded in sharing and exchange—a feature of globalized societies—may find it less necessary to engage in costly punishment.

Both sexes were less trusting of sexually-accessible women in a Trust Game (TG) (study 2); women (but not men), however, inflicted costly punishment on a sexually-accessible woman in an Ultimatum Game (UG) (study 3).

Additionally, anonymous experiments measuring costly punishment (total n = 6,076) show the same pattern: subjects punish more when sharing is not possible.

Here we investigated in two consecutive studies, whether testosterone is associated with parochial altruism depending on individual tendency for costly punishment.

This study provides the first evidence that evoked brain activity by unfairness in the bilateral AI is influenced by genes and sheds light on the genetic basis of brain processes underlying costly punishment.

I find the principal’s cost is sometimes minimized by using both costly rewards and costly punishments because (1) the agent has an outside option, or (2) a principal without commitment ability repeatedly interacts with the agent.

A patient's costly punishment is introduced as a mechanism to enhance cooperation among the three populations.